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The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919-1939
(Click to Enlarge)
Scot Robertson
Book Code: C4997
ISBN: 0-275-94997-4
ISBN-13: 978-0-275-94997-6
224 pages, figures, tables
Praeger Publishers
Publication: 1/30/1995
List Price: $75.00 (UK Sterling Price: £41.95)
Availability: Print on demand
Media Type: Hardcover
Trim Size: 6 1/8 x 9 1/4
Subjects: Reviews:
  • Robertson builds on the work of the small band, well identified in his notes and bibliography, who have examined the history of the RAF in the interwar years. Highly recommended as seminal. All levels.
    —
    Choice
  • Endorsement From S.F. Wise
    Professor of History
    Carleton University, Ottawa:     Firmly based upon an intelligent application of Clausewitzian thought, this study demonstrates, with almost painful clarity, the illusions and wishful thinking which passed for strategic bombing doctrine in the RAF, and explains why, in 1939, Bomber Command was utterly unready to carry out the role advertised for it for the previous 20 years....This study is indispensable not only for air historians, but for all concerned with the development of strategic thought.
  • Endorsement From John Alan English, Lt. Col. (Ret.)
    Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario
    Author of On Infantry and The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign:     No doubt Robertson will be challenged on many of the grounds he has covered, but the subsequent controversy generated will in all probability be well worth the airing.
Description: The history of "strategic bombing" is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine the fundamental principles of "strategic" bombing, the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.
Table of Contents:
  • Acknowledgments
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • Strategic Bombing as an Idea: The Relationship of Theory and Strategy
  • The Role of Theory
  • Early Experience with "Strategic" Air Power
  • The Foundations of Independent Air Power
  • The Theory of the Strategic Offensive and the Battles in Whitehall
  • The Development of Doctrine in the RAF
  • Equipment Policy and Aircraft Development
  • Equipping the Bomber Aircraft
  • Formulating and Testing Strategic Doctrine
  • Doctrinal Considerations and Tactical Problems
  • The Planning Process and Operations
  • Conclusion
  • Appendix
  • Bibliography
  • Index
LC Card Number: 94-22654
LCC Class: UG635
Dewey Class: 358.4
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