The Outbreak of the First World War

Book flyer
MS Word
International
MS Word

The Outbreak of the First World War Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure

(Click to Enlarge)

This book is not currently available for purchase Online. Please call 1-800-225-5800 to backorder.

John H. Maurer

Book Code: C4998

ISBN: 0-275-94998-2

ISBN-13: 978-0-275-94998-3

DOI:

168 pages

Praeger Publishers

Publication: 10/30/1995

List Price: $103.95 (UK Sterling Price: £59.95)

Availability: Out of stock

Media Type: Hardcover

Also Available: Ebook

Trim Size: 6 1/8 x 9 1/4

Subjects:

Series Title: Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought

Reviews:

Historians have long studied the origins of the First World War and both of these volumes make an important contribution to this debate....[M]aurer's study offers a concise and, in its major themes, correct interpretation of the causes of the First World War that is particularly well-suited for classroom use at the seminar level.
—The Jornal of Military History

Description: This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.

Table of Contents:

Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
War Planning
The Short War Dogma
Austria-Hungary's War Plans
Prewar Military Collaboration between Austria-Hungary and Germany
The July Crisis
A Terrorist Attack in Sarajevo; Austria-Hungary and Germany Decide for War
Russia's Decision for War
Vienna and Berlin Order General Mobilization
East or West in Germany's Deployment
Britain's Decision for War
Conclusion: Why Deterrence Failed in 1914
Appendix I: Austria-Hungary's Mobilization Calendar
Appendix II: Tabular Overview of the Movement of the "B"-Staffel in 1914
Appendix III: Staabs' Deployment East
Bibliography
Index

LC Card Number: 95-22012

LCC Class: D521

Dewey Class: 940


All rights reserved. Copyright © 1999-2008 Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. 88 Post Road West, Westport CT 06881, (203) 226-3571