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The Art of Insurgency American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia
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Donald W. Hamilton
Foreword by Cecil B. Currey
Book Code: C5734
ISBN: 0-275-95734-9
ISBN-13: 978-0-275-95734-6
216 pages, figures, maps
Praeger Publishers
Publication: 1/30/1998
List Price: $106.95 (UK Sterling Price: £59.95)
Availability: In Stock
Media Type: Hardcover
Trim Size: 6 1/8 x 9 1/4
Subjects: Reviews:
  • A well-researched look into why insurgencies occur, why they sometimes fail, and why more often seem to succeed.
    —Sea Power
  • Endorsement From from the Foreword by Cecil B. Currey, University of South Florida
    and award-winning author of Victory at Any Cost:     In noteworthy fashion, Hamilton discusses insurgency as a "method" and as a "type" of warfare. His analysis is clearly superior to anything yet written. I have been studying the Viet Nam conflict for 22 years. Without any reservations, I believe this to be the best book I have yet seen on this subject, and I have read most of them.
Description: In his analysis of insurgency war, Donald Hamilton first attempts to provide insight into a strategic concept he believes is little understood today, and to explain its complicated relationship to American policy failures in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 era of containment. The study develops a working model of insurgency, explaining it as both a unique method and type of war-making. Significant findings include the inability of policymakers to perceive a potential insurgency in Vietnam as early as 1946, subsequent American involvement in not one, but three Asian insurgencies during the 1950s, and the ultimate failure of the U.S. military to meet the insurgency challenge in South Vietnam. This inability to eliminate the insurgency led not only to the complete breakdown of the South Vietnamese government, but was the primary reason why further U.S. military action after 1965 would prove ineffectual. This historical narrative also follows the involvement of several key players, including the personalities of Edward Lansdale, Sir Robert Thompson, Archimedes Patti, and Vo Nguyen Giap, who through their life experiences and writings, provide a keen profundity into why insurgencies occur, why they fail, and why they succeed.
Table of Contents:
  • Foreword
  • Preface
  • Illustrations
  • Maps
  • List of Abbreviations
  • Figures
  • Insurgency and American Military Doctrine: An Introduction
  • Explaining Insurgency
  • An Analysis of Two Postwar Asian Insurgencies
  • The First Vietnamese Insurgency, 1945-1954
  • Seeds of American Commitment
  • The Second Vietnamese Insurgency: Phase I
  • The Second Vietnamese Insurgency: Phase II
  • Secondary Insurgency and the American Reaction
  • Summary Notes on Lessons of a Failed Strategy
  • Selected Bibliography
  • Index
LC Card Number: 96-44178
LCC Class: U241
Dewey Class: 355
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