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Bipartisan Strategy Selling the Marshall Plan
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John Bledsoe Bonds
Book Code: C7804
ISBN: 0-275-97804-4
ISBN-13: 978-0-275-97804-4
256 pages
Praeger Publishers
Publication: 12/30/2002
List Price: $98.95 (UK Sterling Price: £57.95)
Availability: Out of stock
Media Type: Hardcover
Trim Size: 6 1/8 x 9 1/4
Subjects: Reviews:
  • John Bledsoe Bonds, developing his analysis on a broad base of secondary and primary sources, doues a very good job in depicting the interplay of the various factions and departments involved in formulating American foreign policy.
    —The Journal of American History     December 2004
  • [J]ohn Bledsoe Bonds argues convincingly, the congressional passage of the Marshall Plan in the spring of 1948, in the midst of a perceived war crisis, marks the final acceptance of the Cold War policy of containment that would guide American diplomacy for the next four decades.
    —Political Science Quarterly     Winter 2003-2004
Description: Employing extensive archival research, Bonds examines the reciprocal relationship of effect between domestic and international politics, which cannot be understood adequately without examining the process of making policy. As Bonds demonstrates, this is a messy contest requiring that policy be adapted or compromised to fit the existing political alignment. It is illustrated most clearly in a situation of differentiated control of the White House and Congress, when a bipartisan consensus must be developed, as in 1947-48. Bonds also examines the development of the Cold War, and the process of passing the Marshall Plan is shown to have been a significant factor in the recognition of confrontation on both sides. The notion that the Marshall Plan was a plan to achieve world economic dominion, or to find a market for surplus U.S. goods is debunked, and Bonds disputes the charge that Truman and Marshall deliberately produced a "war scare" to increase defense budgets. He also contests the argument that the United States depended on the atomic bomb to deter the Soviets in the early Cold War period and demonstrates that Truman and Marshall had no concept at all of a "National Security State" in 1947 and early 1948. Instead, they sought a national militia system and firmly suppressed military appropriations in favor of a balanced budget. This is a provocative work for scholars and students of American politics, international relations, and diplomatic history.
Table of Contents:
  • Setting
  • Immediate Origins: Aid to Greece and Turkey
  • Immediate Origins II
  • Domestic Activity
  • Europe Responds
  • Congressional Interlude
  • Events Intrude
  • Other Logics
  • Citizens' Committee for the Marshall Plan
  • Interim Aid
  • Last Chance at Accommodation: The London Conference
  • Preparing for the Main Event
  • The Main Event
  • Universal Military Training
  • A Falling Barometer
  • A New Paradigm
  • The Final Innings
  • Reflections on the Process of Approval
  • Selected Bibliography
LC Card Number: 2002026966
LCC Class: HC240
Dewey Class: 338
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