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Between Ideology and Realpolitik Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921
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By Georg Schild
ISBN: 0-313-29570-0
ISBN-13: 978-0-313-29570-6
192 pages
Greenwood Press
Publication: 6/30/1995
List Price: $107.95 (UK Sterling Price: £59.95)
Availability:
Media Type: Hardcover
Trim Size: 6 1/8 x 9 1/4
Subjects:
Series Title: Contributions to the Study of World History
Series Number: 51
Reviews:
  • Schild has offered a thoughtful analysis of a diffucult and complicated problem...

    The International History Review
  • Endorsement From
    Professor Klaus Schwabe, Chair, Modern History
    University of Technology, Aachen, Germany:
    For decades historians have tried to understand the ambivalences characteristic of Woodrow Wilson's policy vis-à-vis revolutionary Russia. In his clearly written and well reasoned study, Schild arrives at original interpretations based on the vast array of previous research and analysis. This synthesis has thus become a valuable contribution to the scholarly discussion of Wilson's motives for intervening in the Russian civil war and for maintaining his vision of a united and democratic Russia.
  • Endorsement From
    Karen A.J. Miller, Assistant Professor
    Department of History, Oakland University:
    It is a solid work and makes a substantial contribution to the literature concerning the Wilson presidency. It will serve as a useful tool for advanced scholars and will provide an important point of departure for undergraduates studying Woodrow Wilson and American policy toward Russia.
Description: In this concise, readable interpretation of Wilson's Russian policy, Schild challenges the belief that Wilson's reaction to the 1917 October Revolution was exclusively ideological. In contrast to the belief that when Wilson sent American troops to intervene in July 1918, his goal was to aid liberal groups in Russia and thus to establish a democratic order, this book shows that his actions were more pragmatic. Wilson did, indeed, have a liberal anti-Bolshevik agenda. However, his belief in the superiority of liberalism over totalitarianism was so strong that he expected democratic forces in Russia to take power without any outside aid. At the Paris Peace Conference, he rejected all suggestions for a Western anti-Soviet crusade or for a division of Russia. His 1918 decision to intervene was not part of Wilson's ideological confrontation with the Bolsheviks. It was based on an effort to maintain unity with the British and French governments during the final phase of World War I. Wilson's Russian policy, the author concludes, was determined both by his ideological anti-Bolshevism and pragmatic demands for alliance cohesion.
Table of Contents:
  • Introduction
  • War and Revolution
  • "Without Annexations and Contributions": Wilson, Lenin, and the War-Aims Question
  • The Decision to Intervene
  • Intervention and the Paris Peace Conference: Wilson's Soviet Policy in 1919
  • National Self-Determination vs. "Russia One and Indivisible"
  • Conclusions
  • Bibliography
  • Index
LC Card Number: 94-46927
LCC Class: E183
Dewey Class: 327.7304
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